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1 Introduction: indeterminacy and cognitive role
Suppose that you’re certain that (1) lacks a determinate truth value. I.e., you
are fully confident that it is not determinately true and not determinately false.
(1) Frida is tall.
What attitude should you take towards (1)? Reject it? Suspend judgement?
Adopt middling confidence? Adopt a special vagueness-related mode of un-
certainty? Or what? Answering this question would be to take a stance on the
cognitive role of indeterminacy.1 It is the first step in building a theory of ra-
tional belief—and eventually an entire normative psychology—appropriate to
sentences and propositions that lack determinate truth values.2
Call an answer to the cognitive role question exclusionary if the attitude
to (1) it recommends is something that is rationally incompatible with belief.
Middling confidence, suspension of judgement, rejection, a special mode of
uncertainty—all these answers are exclusionary in the relevant sense. Despite
their differences, exclusionary answers can reach consensus on the following:
less than full confidence that A is determinate rationally requires less than full
confidence that A. The contraposed form of this principle will be our start-
ing point in what follows: certainty of A rationally requires certainty that A is
determinate.
Since the exclusionary view is our starting point, we briefly motivate it
(what follows idealizes away from the possibility of higher-order indetermi-
nacy, which we discuss later). Suppose that an agent is less than fully confident
that it’s determinately true that Frida is tall. Assuming the usual link between
credence and dispositions to bet, an agent who is fully confident that Frida is
tall should be willing to take bets at any odds (or at least, at extremely unfavor-
able odds) on the proposition that Frida is tall. It seems strange to do so while
1For explicit attempts to answer this question, see Field 2000, 2004, 2008; Schiffer 2003; Dorr
2003; Smith 2008; Williams 2014a,b; Bacon 2018
2For attempts to talk about vague desire and rational belief, desire and decision in the context
of vagueness, see for example Edgington 1997; Williams 2016.
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having some credence that it’s not determinately true that Frida is tall. If you
agree, you should be sympathetic to the exclusionary starting point above that
rules it out.
Among the various exclusionary positions, perhaps the least plausible is the
following: when you’re certain that it’s indeterminate whether Frida is tall, it
is rationally required that you utterly reject Frida being tall. This is rejection-
ism. It has defenders (cf. Field 2004), but it is a minority position. Most find
it surprising as a thesis about indeterminacy associated with borderline cases
of paradigmatically vague properties. As we point out below, rejectionism is
intolerable for at least some applications of indeterminacy—for example, for
thesis that the openness of the future consists in indeterminacy of future con-
tingents.3
The main result of this paper is that the principle about certainty that we
take as our starting point, together with some minimal side-premises, entails
rejectionism. This is a surprising result, which requires abandoning at least
some of our intuitive views about indeterminacy and cognitive role. As we
point out in the final sections, there is at least a formal analogy between our
argument and various triviality arguments that have been presented in the lit-
erature on conditionals and modals.4 Perhaps this points towards a general
solution. One tempting moral, which would apply both to our puzzle and
to standard triviality arguments, is that standard Bayesian assumptions about
learning need to be revised when we countenance modal, conditional, and de-
terminacy operator. But what we say leaves open the idea that our puzzle
requires a different kind of solution.
2 Formalizing the main claims
We start by formalizing the key theses in play. Let ‘det’ stand for "it is determi-
nate that". We work with a space of degrees of belief, but make only weak as-
sumptions about it. There could be three degrees of belief (belief, agnosticism,
full disbelief), or there could be infinitely many degrees of belief, modelled
by the real numbers between [0,1], or by intervals drawn from [0,1]. All we
assume is that these degrees of belief are at least partially ordered by compar-
ative strength (≥), and that there is a strongest degree of belief (represented by
1, which we’ll label certainty) and a weakest degree of belief (represented by
0, which we’ll label rejection). We use ‘C’ to denote the set of all rational belief
states. Also, we assume that degrees of belief are defined over propositions,
3Discussion of the indeterminate future dates back to Aristotle. For a clear recent articulation
of the view on which future contingents are indeterminate, see Barnes and Cameron 2009.
4The literature on triviality results was started by Lewis 1976; see Hájek and Hall 1994 for
an overview of early triviality results. For more recent results, see Bradley 2000, 2007; see also
Charlow 2016; Russell and Hawthorne 2016; Goldstein forthcoming for extensions of triviality
results beyond conditionals.
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and we use Roman sans-serif capitals (‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, . . .) as metavariables ranging
over propositions. (All our arguments also carry over to a picture on which de-
grees of belief apply to sentences, modulo the usual qualifications concerning
context dependence.)
We assume that agents have both categorical degrees of belief in proposi-
tions, and conditional degrees of belief in one proposition given another. If Cr
picks out such a belief state we use Cr(A) to pick out a degree of categorical
belief in A and Cr(B | A) the degree of conditional belief in B given A. We un-
derstand conditional degree of belief in terms of update: Cr(B | A) denotes the
posterior degree of belief in B had by a rational agent with prior credence func-
tion Cr, upon learning A (with certainty, as total information). On standard
Bayesian accounts, the conditional credence Cr(B | A) is also set, by definition,
to be equal to the ratio of the unconditional credences Cr(A∧B) and Cr(A). But,
on the current proposal, this is a substantial claim—indeed, one of the routes
to block the argument will consist precisely in denying the ratio formula.
Let us now formalize our main claims. Our starting principle can be ex-
pressed as follows:
∀Cr ∈ C : Cr(A) = 1⇒ Cr(det A) = 1 (certainty)
The rejectionist thesis is:
∀Cr ∈ C : Cr(¬det A∧¬det¬A) = 1⇒ Cr(A) = 0 (rejectionism)
To prove rejectionism, we prove a claim that entails it, namely the inequality:5
∀Cr ∈ C : Cr(det A) ≥ Cr(A) (equiv1)
Let us also observe that equiv2 is pretty clearly true, and so we can strengthen
our conclusion to the very informative identity equivalence:6
∀Cr ∈ C : Cr(det A) ≤ Cr(A) (equiv2)
∀Cr ∈ C : Cr(det A) = Cr(A). (equivalence)
5Two principles generate this entailment: (a) that A being indeterminate and it being determi-
nate that A are inconsistent; and that if one is certain of one of a pair of inconsistent propositions,
one is rationally required to reject the other. The antecedent of rejectionism tells us that we are
certain of A being indeterminate, so we must reject det A which is inconsistent with it. Then by
equiv1 we must reject A, i.e. the consequent of rejectionism.
6We can also argue for it given a few more principles: (a) rational degree of belief doesn’t drop
over logical consequence; (b) determinacy is factive: det A |= A.
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3 The proof
We are to prove equiv1 from certainty. Note that when Cr(A) = 0 then equiv1
holds, so we may assume Cr(A) , 0.
We assume three side premises. The first two are constraints on rational
degrees of belief:
Cr(A | A) = 1 (identity)
Cr(B | A) = 1⇒ Cr(B) ≥ Cr(A) (bound)
The third side premise is a closure principle, stating that that the result of
updating a rational credence on proposition C (itself of non-zero credence) is
a rational credence function:
∀C : Cr(•) ∈ C ∧Cr(C) , 0⇒ Cr(• | C) ∈ C (closure)
We say more in defense of these side premises below. For the moment, let us
flag that all of them are entailed by standard Bayesian tenets about credence—
though one doesn’t need to be a Bayesian to endorse them.
With these assumptions in place, it’s simple to state the proof. Start with
an arbitrary rational belief state Cr. By an instance of closure, Cr(• | A) is a
rational belief state. We argue:
1. Cr(A | A) = 1 (from identity, applied to Cr ∈ C)
2. If Cr(A | A) = 1, Cr(det A | A) = 1 (certainty, applied to Cr(• | A) ∈ C)
3. Cr(det A | A) = 1 (from 1 and 2)
4. Cr(det A) ≥ Cr(A) (from 2 and Bound, applied to Cr ∈ C)
The last line is the relevant instance of equiv1, as required.
4 Reactions to the argument
The argument is valid, so there are just five things one can do in response:
i. Accept equiv1 and so accept rejectionism
ii. Reject identity
iii. Reject bound
iv. Reject closure
v. Reject certainty
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On the face of it, none of these options seems particularly plausible. Yet at least
one of them has to be right. So the proof in §3 poses a puzzle.
We should observe that the puzzle holds for every single proposition. So,
for example, suppose you think that closure fails as a general thesis for ar-
bitrary propositions, because some of those propositions simply are not ratio-
nally learnable. That gets you out of one instance of the argument, but does
nothing to help you get out of other instances of the argument involving propo-
sitions that are rationally learnable.
So we should distinguish two ways of reacting to the puzzle. On the one
hand, we might defend an across-the-board solution. For example, we might
endorse rejectionism for every single proposition; or one may resist the ar-
gument by denying that identity ever holds. On the other, we might defend a
piecemeal solution. For example, we might hold that certainty fails for certain
propositions, and rejectionism is true for others.
In the next sections, we discuss options (i)–(v). We won’t try to settle defini-
tively which of them is right, but we will steer the debate in directions that
seem plausible to us.
4.1 Accepting rejectionism
As we said, some cognitive role theorists endorse rejectionism. So one might
think that we just provided an argument for an across-the-board endorsement
of this position. We want to resist this conclusion, which we find particuarly
implausible.
Why is rejectionism so implausible? Notice that there are many different
kinds of indeterminacy. There are borderline cases of paradigm gradable ad-
jectives (tall, bald, red), but there are also borderline cases of the relation being
the same person as. Believers in the open future hold that future contingents
are indeterminate. The conditional if I roll a fair die, it will land even is classi-
fied as indeterminate on many theories. In many of these cases, rejectionism
straightforwardly conflicts with common sense. One obvious case is that of
future contingents. My attitude to the indeterminate future contingent I will
catch the train this afternoon is uncertainty, not utter disbelief. More in gen-
eral, our processes of deliberation about the future seem to presuppose that
propositions about the future should receive positive credence, even though it
is indeterminate whether they are true. So endorsing rejectionism about fu-
ture contingents would be disruptive both for our ordinary deliberations and
for our philosophical theorizing about them. Similar considerations apply to
other kinds of indeterminacy. For example, assigning positive credence to in-
determinate claims about personal identity is arguably central to understand-
ing moral and self-interested concern for the future.7
7For an argument for an exclusionary answer to the cognitive role question on this sort of basis,
see Williams 2014b.
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Perhaps these considerations can be overridden via decisive theoretical ar-
guments. But, absent these, we think that rejectionism should not be invoked
as an across-the-board solution. We need to explore further options.
4.2 Rejecting identity
Rejecting identity (repeated below), whether across the board or for some
cases, also seems implausible.
Cr(A | A) = 1 (identity)
All we need to derive identity are two principles that seem very safe. The first
is simply the logical validity of iteration. The second is a principle saying that,
if A entails B, the conditional probability of the latter given the former is 1.
A  A (iteration)
If A  B, then Cr(B | A) = 1 (entailment)
At the very least, it’s extraordinarily implausible that we will be able to appeal
to the rejection of identity as an across-the-board response to the puzzle.8
4.3 Rejecting bound
Consider now bound:
Cr(B | A) = 1⇒ Cr(B) ≥ Cr(A) (bound)
Let us observe first that bound is entailed by the classical construal of condi-
tional probability, spelled out in ratio, together with the principle that one’s
credence in a conjunct is an upper bound in one’s credence in a conjunction.9
Cr(A∧B) = Cr(B | A)×Cr(A) (ratio)
Cr(A) ≥ Cr(A∧B) (conjunction)
conjunction seems extremely plausible. Of course, we could find a weird
enough logic for conjunction that invalidates it. But for current purposes we
won’t question it. Assuming that conjunction is safe, then, rejecting bound
entails rejecting ratio.
8Though see the discussion of degrees of determinacy and conditional probability in Williams
2016 for a precedent.
9Proof: assume Cr(B | A) = 1. Then, via ratio, Cr(A ∧ B) = Cr(A). Via conjunction, Cr(B) ≥
Cr(A∧B); by replacing Cr(A∧B) with Cr(A) in the inequality it follows that Cr(B) ≥ Cr(A).
Incidentally, notice that ratio assumes that multiplication is well-defined on degrees of belief.
So, in order to claim that bound follows from ratio, we need more substantial assumptions about
degrees of belief than the ones we have taken up in §2.
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Of course, classical Bayesians take ratio to be definitional of conditional
probability. But recall that in §2 we explicitly disavowed this construal. Rather,
we defined conditional credence in terms of update, and left it as an issue to
be adjudicated whether ratio holds. So one option is to deny that the notion of
conditional probability that captures update can be defined in the usual way.
We come back to this option in §7.
4.4 Rejecting closure
closure says that the result of updating a rational credence function on propo-
sition C (itself of non-zero credence) is also a rational credence function.
In §2, we defined conditional probabilities just as the probabilities that are
reached by a rational agent via update. So we are guaranteed that, for any
proposition C that captures an agent’s total evidence, conditonalizing on C has
to lead to a rational credal state. This leaves room for one way in which closure
could fail. It might be that some propositions cannot serve as a rational agent’s
total evidence. In particular, we might claim that one can only learn perfectly
determinate propositions: learning A always entails also learning det A. We
will return also to this claim later on.
4.5 Rejecting certainty
certainty (repeated below) is the principle we have introduced in this paper.
∀Cr ∈ C : Cr(A) = 1⇒ Cr(det A) = 1 (certainty)
We have already defended it informally in the introduction. Here we give two
explicit arguments for it.
First, we revisit the idea that any exclusionary cognitive role for indetermi-
nacy is committed to certainty. Suppose for reductio that certainty fails.
Then there is a rational credence function Cr such that Cr(det A) < 1 and
Cr(A) = 1. So there must be some possibility w given non-zero credence such
that Cr(det A | w) = 0. But we also know that Cr(A | w) = 1, and since det¬A is
incompatible with A, Cr(det¬A | w) = 0, and so Cr(det A∨ det¬A | w) = 0. Ab-
sent higher order indeterminacy, which will be considered more fully below,
this means Cr(¬det A∧¬det¬A | w) = 1. So a failure of certainty commit us
(via closure) to a rational belief state in which we are certain that a proposi-
tion is indeterminate and certain of that proposition itself. That is absurd on its
face, but more specifically, it is incompatible with any exclusionary conception
of the cognitive role of indeterminacy, on which something incompatible with
full belief (e.g. middling confidence, suspension of judgement etc) is required
when we are certain a proposition is indeterminate.
Second, a number of theorists hold that assertability requires determinacy:
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if a subject is in a position to assert A, then it is determinately true that A.10
assert A ` det A (p1)
It is very plausible, moreover, that complete confidence in a proposition suf-
fices for complete confidence that that proposition is assertable.11
∀Cr ∈ C : Cr(A) = 1⇒ Cr(assert A) = 1 (p2)
From (p1) and (p2), together with a basic principle about monotonicity of cre-
dence12, we get certainty.
5 Roadmap
The rest of the paper expands the discussion in three directions. In §6 we show
how the argument can be generalized in various ways, to sidestep different
kinds of resistance maneuvers. In §7, we discuss in detail the possibility of
blocking the argument by rejecting closure, in the light of a result developed
by [name omitted for blind review]. In §8, we explore the analogy with triviality
arguments for modals and conditionals.
6 Generalizations
This section aims at generalizing the reach of the argument. Some theorists
might be tempted to block the argument by giving up on certainty, appealing
to one of a number of motivations. In this section, we show that these attempts
still lead to results that are unacceptable to non-rejectionists.
6.1 Hedging Certainty
Here is one reason why one might think that certainty, while on the right
lines, is too strong. Suppose you are walking through a rose garden, looking
down a line of roses that incrementally change from clear red to clear orange.
You might think that you can remain certain that a rose is red in cases where
we have at least some doubt whether the rose is determinately red.13 That
is: while confidence in a rose being determinately red cannot be dramatically
lower than your confidence in it being red, one might think that it is rationally
permissible for there to be a slight drop between the latter and the former.
10For example, we interpret in this way the notion of determinate truth in McGee and McLaugh-
lin 1995.
11At least, in an idealized sense of assertability, that abstracts from Gricean considerations of
conversational relevance, informativity, etc.
12The principle, which follows from entailment and bound, is that, if A  B, then Cr(A) ≤ Cr(B).
13Thanks to [name omitted for blind review] for this kind of case.
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If we take this suggestion on board, we will replace certainty with the
following modified principle:
Cr(A) = 1⇒ Cr(det A) ≈ 1 (hedged certainty)
Here x ≈ y presupposes a new relation among degrees of belief: that of
being near one another. If degrees of belief are modelled by real numbers in
[0,1], x ≈ y may be read as |x − y| < ε for some small ε.
The following variant of bound is just as plausible as the original:14
Cr(B | A) ≈ 1⇒ Cr(B) & Cr(A) (hedged bound)
But now, a result follows that is similar to our original. Putting hedged cer-
tainty and hedged bound together with identity and closure, the argument
proceeds as before, with the conclusion:
Cr(det A) & Cr(A) (hedged equiv1)
And this establishes a hedged version of rejectionism:
Cr(¬det A∧¬det¬A) = 1⇒ Cr(A) ≈ 0 (hedged rejectionism)
Dialectically, this is just as bad for anti-rejectionists as the original result.
Their thesis was that the appropriate response to indeterminacy was some state
of uncertainty—middling credence, agnosticism, or whatever—that is incom-
patible with hedged rejection.
6.2 Higher Order Indeterminacy
Our interlocutor may at this point withdraw even from hedged certainty, and
reframe her worry. Perhaps the real worry with our almost-borderline red
rose was higher order vagueness. If there are higher order borderline cases—
borderline cases between it being indeterminate whether a rose is red and it
being determinate whether a rose is red—then, she reasons, it must be possi-
ble to have a determinately red rose that is not determinately determinately
red. Certainty that such a rose is red may be appropriate (since the rose is de-
terminately red). But ex hypothesi, the rose is not determinately determinately
red. Hence the appropriate attitude towards the proposition the rose is deter-
minately red could be the very kind of uncertainty appropriate to propositions
that are indeterminate. (Note too that, suspiciously, we idealized away from
higher order indeterminacy in motivating certainty).
We might question our interlocuteur’s case, since it is not clear that we
can (with rational certainty) identify a case as one of determinate but not
14Here we’re understanding & as follows: x & y ⇐⇒ x ≥ y ∨ x ≈ y.
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determinate-determinate redness, as see supposes. We think she should not
have given up on hedged certainty so quickly. But rather than push this point,
we develop another route to something tantamount to our original conclusion.
One of the reasons for interest in the variant presented below is that—like the
original, but unlike the hedged version just given—it is very neutral on the
quantity and structure of degrees of belief, not requiring notions like "near
certainty" in its formulation.
This variant of our argument uses a weakened determinacy operator, detw.
We drop certainty and instead start from:
Cr(A) = 1⇒ Cr(detwA) = 1 (weak certainty)
What is weak determinacy? If determinacy means: has degree of truth 1,
then weak determinacy may be: having degree of truth at least 0.75. If de-
terminacy requires that a proposition be true on every sharpening, then weak
determinacy may be: being true on three quarters of the sharpenings.
We run the argument exactly as before, substituting detw for det through-
out and using only the original side premises identity, bound, and closure.
We obtain:
Cr(detwA) ≥ Cr(A) (weak equiv1)
And this establishes another variant of rejectionism:
Cr(¬detwA∧¬detw¬A) = 1⇒ Cr(A) = 0 (weak rejectionism)
detw is entailed by det, but does not entail it, so it is easier to be confi-
dent that detw applies to a proposition than that det applies to it. weakened
certainty is indeed a weaker claim that certainty. Dually, the notion of in-
determinacy that is defined out of weak determinacy is stronger than straight
indeterminacy: only when you are certain that A is a ‘central case’ of indeter-
minacy should you be certain that neither it nor its negation is even weakly
determinate. But of course, rivals to rejectionism who think that uncertainty is
called for when you are certain that something is indeterminate will a fortiori
think that uncertainty (rather than rejection) is called for in these central cases
of indeterminacy. So weak rejectionism is not something they can live with.15
15Higher order weak determinacy is little explored, but of obvious relevance here. For example,
on Williamson’s fixed-width margin of error models for higher order vagueness (1992; 1994) noth-
ing is higher-order weakly determinate at all orders. This could form the basis for an independent
objection to weak certainty. However, our initial investigations show that there are natural vari-
ants of these models that avoid this feature. An objection from this quarter would have to dig into
the plausibility of the various detailed modelling assumptions in play.
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6.3 Regularity
We consider one final attempt at sidestepping the argument. Some Bayesians
say that it is irrational to ever become certain of any proposition that is not a
logical truth: rationality requires that we always remain open to the possibil-
ity of error. This is a controversial general thesis about rationality, known as
‘regularity’.16 In the context of our argument, regularity is relevant because it
clashes badly with closure.17 closure states that, if a credence function Cr
counts as rational, the credence function Cr(• | A) that we obtain by condi-
tonalizing on A also counts as rational. Regularity states that conditionalizing
on a proposition A is rational only if A is a logical truth.
To address these concerns, we make use of notions of approximate certainty
again. Assume that we cannot rationally learn contingent propositions with
certainty. Plausibly, though, we are able to become nearly certain of them:
we write Cr(• ↑ C) for the result of updating on C in the sense of becoming
almost certain of it. In the typical Bayesian framework where degrees of belief
are modelled by the unit interval [0,1], Cr(• ↑ C) can be characterized as the
result of Jeffrey-conditionalizing on a partition that includes C, and where C’s
coefficient is 1− ε, where ε is the very constant used to characterize ≈ earlier.
We can now run a variant of our argument with the following premises,
built around a notion of approximate closure specifically designed to appeal
to fans of the regularity constraint. For this, we need not just notions of ap-
proximate equality ≈, but approximate approximate equality ≈≈, approximate
approximate approximate equality ≈≈≈ etc.18 The argument runs:
Cr(A) ≈ 1⇒ Cr(det A) ≈ 1 (approximate certainty)
Cr(A ↑ A) ≈ 1 (approximate identity)
Cr(B ↑ A) ≈ 1⇒ Cr(B) ' Cr(A) (approximate bound)
∀C : Cr(•) ∈ C ∧Cr(C) , 0⇒ Cr(• ↑ C) ∈ C (approximate closure)
The argument then proceeds exactly as before, with the conclusion:
Cr(det A) ' Cr(A) (approx equiv1)
And this establishes an approximate version of rejectionism:
Cr(¬det A∧¬det¬A) ≈ 1 =⇒ Cr(A) ≈≈≈ 0 (approx rejectionism)
This is no better for rivals to rejectionism than was the original conclusion.
If you think that agnosticism or middling credence is the right response to
16For discussion and references, see ?.
17This response was first put to us by [name omitted for blond review]Compare Lewis 1986.
18If credences are real numbers, we have x ≈ y is true iff |x − y| ≤ ε, and analogously, x ≈≈ y iff
|x − y| ≤ 2ε, x ≈≈≈ y |x − y| ≤ 3ε, etc. x ' y := x ≥ y ∨ x ≈≈ y.
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indeterminacy, then you shouldn’t think that if we’re nearly certain that some-
thing is indeterminate, we’re forced to be within a small distance of 1 (approx-
imately approximately approximately equal to 1)—but that is what approxi-
mate rejectionism tells us.
Even for those who do not insist on regularity, the above form of our argu-
ment holds interest. One reaction to the argument that we discuss in §7 below
holds that some propositions could be rationally learned with certainty (pace
regularity), but that they have to be perfectly determinate. But the discussion
in this section shows that, to resist all versions of the argument, one must hold
that possibly vague propositions are unlearnable in a much stronger sense: we
cannot even learn them in the Jeffrey-conditionalization sense.
Before moving on, let us we point out that the resources that we have de-
ployed throughout this section can be brought together. Approximate and
hedged versions of our argument can be combined; we discuss the resulting
principles in a footnote.19
7 Denying closure or ratio: restricting principles to perfectly determinate
propositions
In §4, we saw that two of the most promising strategies for resisting the ar-
gument were linked to changing our understanding of conditional probability
and update. In this section, we investigate these routes in further detail.
Let us first consider denying closure (repeated below).20
∀C : Cr(•) ∈ C ∧Cr(C) , 0⇒ Cr(• | C) ∈ C (closure)
Each instance of closure follows from two claims. First: a rational agent with
prior belief state Cr, who learns C as total information with certainty, has pos-
terior (categorical) beliefs given by Cr(• | C). Second: the particular C involved
19Someone might have the concern that a belief in A being within  of 1 doesn’t guarantee that
our belief in det A is within  of 1. But this interlocutor may endorse a suitably hedged variant
of the principle: that the consequent follows if A meets some tighter bound–within some δ of 1,
where δ < ε. Writing ' for this tighter approximation, we can combine approximate and hedged
versions of our argument via the following premises:
Cr(A) ' 1⇒ Cr(detwA) ≈ 1 (hedged weak approx certainty)
Cr(A ↑ A) ' 1 (hedged approx identity)
Cr(B ↑ A) ≈ 1⇒ Cr(B) ' Cr(A) (approximate bound)
∀C : Cr(•) ∈ C ∧Cr(C) , 0⇒ Cr(• ↑ C) ∈ C (approximate closure)
There are contexts where this variant of our argument—strengthened in several dimensions—is
required.
20For discussion of this material, we are indebted to names omitted for blind review .
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in the instance of closure is learnable: it is possible to learn it, with certainty,
as total information.
Resistance on the first point is ruled out, given the way we are understand-
ing conditional probability in the present context. In §2, we have simply stipu-
lated that Cr(B | A) denotes the posterior degree of belief in B had by a rational
agent with prior credence function Cr, upon learning A with certainty as total
information. So the only route to deny closure is to target the second con-
dition: we might deny that some propositions can be learned as one’s total
information.
Even though closure involves universal quantification over propositions,
all we need to run an instance of our argument is a particular instance of clo-
sure. So, if we want to pursue an across-the-board solution to the problem via
this route, we need to deny all instances of closure that involve propositions
that are possibly indeterminate. That is, we should maintain that all propo-
sitions that can rationally be learned with certainty are perfectly determinate:
they are of the form pdet∗ . . .Aq (where ‘det∗’ stands for an infinite stack of
determinacy operators). In fact, as [name omitted for blind review]has shown
in correspondence, modulo standard classical Bayesian assumptions certainty
is simply equivalent to the claim that all learnable propositions are perfectly
determinate.21
On this option, then, closure fails because Cr(• | C) only picks out a ra-
tional credence function when C is perfectly determinate. (Strictly speaking,
Cr(• | C) is simply undefined, since Cr(• | C) represents the result of rationally
updating Cr on C.)
This is not the place to adjudicate the suggestion that every learnable propo-
sition is perfectly determinate. Let us just notice that this claim is highly con-
troversial, and that it has been forcefully denied recently. For example, An-
drew Bacon (2018) argues that the totality of what we learn through percep-
tion, reflection and testimony is inexact and potentially vague information.
Now, let us turn to the other option: denying ratio (repeated below), with
the goal of invalidating bound.
Cr(A∧B) = Cr(B | A)×Cr(A) (ratio)
Building on our discussion of the failure of closure, there is a natural way
to motivate the failure of ratio. This time we grant that subjects may ratio-
nally update on propositions that are not perfectly determinate, and hence
that Cr(• | C) is well-defined for all C with positive credence. But we claim
that ratio holds if and only if the proposition that is updated on is perfectly
21More precisely: [name] introduces the notion of a determinacy fixed-point, defined as follows:
A is a determinacy fixed-point just in case det A = A.
[name] shows that certainty is equivalent to the claim that evidential propositions are determi-
nacy fixed-points.
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determinate. This gets the result that Cr(A) = Cr(det A) if A is a perfectly de-
terminate proposition, but not otherwise.
Choosing this route might be a plausible option for those who want to ex-
plore a solution similar to the denial of closure, but want to allow that we may
learn not perfectly determinate propositions. So far as we can see, the main
hurdle for this route is to develop a plausible philosophical justification for
the restriction of ratio. We leave this task to future work.
8 Analogies with modal triviality
Our proof has close relatives in the literature on conditionals and modality.
A number of theorists (Stalnaker 1970, Adams 1975, Edgington 1995) have
pointed out an intuitive constraint on credences in conditionals: a subject’s
credences in a conditional should line up with their conditional credences in
the consequent, given the antecedent.
Stalnaker’s Thesis. For all A, B, and for all Cr ∈ C: Cr(A > B) =
Cr(B | A)
The unrestricted endorsement of Stalnaker’s Thesis is notoriously problematic.
Appealing to Stalnaker’s Thesis and to standard Bayesian principles, Lewis
(1976) shows that we can prove that the probability of a conditional A > B has
to be identical to the probability of its consequent—an unacceptable result.
Recent literature on triviality has pointed out that similarly unacceptable
consequences can be reached via assumptions that are strictly weaker and no
less intuitive. Also, it has been pointed out that triviality is not confined to
conditionals, but rather generalizes to modalized statements of various sort.22
[reference omitted for blind review] lays out a template for generating triviality
results of this kind. This template starts from a constraint of the following
form, for specific A and B:
∀Cr ∈ C : Cr(A) = 1⇒ Cr(B) = 1 (triviality schema)
From triviality schema, using standard Bayesian principles, we can prove that
P r(A) ≤ P r(B). Our certainty is, of course, a particular instance of triviality
schema, and equiv1 is the local instance of the schematic consequence men-
tioned. The proof we gave in section 2 can be run schematically, and refines
the premises needed for this schematic connection.
For concreteness, let us consider the following way of instantiating triv-
iality schema: we replace must A (with must understood epistemically) for
B.
∀Cr ∈ C : Cr(A) = 1⇒ Cr(must A) = 1 (must constraint)
22The first point is due to Richard Bradley (see e.g. 2000; 2007); for examples of triviality argu-
ments applied to epistemic modals, see e.g. Russell and Hawthorne 2016, Goldstein forthcoming.
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The consequence of this (in a Bayesian setting, or at least assuming the weaker
side-premises we have employed in this paper) is that credence in A is a lower
bound on the credence of must A. But of course, whenever you’re uncertain
whether A is true or not, your credence in A should be higher than your cre-
dence in must A, since the latter should be zero or near-zero.
Once we see the analogy between the indeterminacy and the modal cases,
it is tempting to seek a unified solution to the two puzzles. Different theorists
will have different inclinations on this issue.
On the one hand, a uniform solution seems prima facie desirable. Once we
see triviality schema, the puzzle appears to be generated by some abstract,
shared features of the logic of determinacy and epistemic modality. On the
other, it might be that the explanatory resources we need to appeal to are go-
ing to be different from case to case. For example, it seems plausible to us
that for the case of modal and conditionals the solution will involve denying
closure or ratio. In fact, this response follows from a natural idea: rational
learning about the world is invariably accompanied by learning about our own
epistemic response: hence e.g. rationally learning A is invariably accompanied
by learning must A. But, as we saw in the previous section, the corresponding
claim for the case of determinacy is at least very controversial. So it is unclear
that a uniform response is desirable.
9 Conclusion
We have given an argument that starts from a plausible principle about de-
terminacy and credence, i.e. certainty, and, via three plausible side-premises,
leads to a controversial claim about cognitive role, i.e. rejectionism.
Seeing this outcome, one might start questioning certainty. But, as we
have argued, certainty is plausible, and moreover reasonable variants of it
lead to equally damaging results. Alternatively, one might want to question
one of the three side-premises. identity seems unassailable. We have seen that
there are routes to denying bound (via denying ratio) and closure, but that
this strategy leads into controversial territory. Other solutions, like switching
to weaker variants of certainty or endorsing regularity, also won’t defeat all
versions of the argument.
We conclude that our puzzle raises a substantial challenge, which is not
easily addressed by any extant account of belief and indeterminacy. We hope
that thinking about it will prove enlightening for theories of cognitive role, as
well as for theorists interested in triviality results of various sorts.
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